A new sample of 85 industries (about 3,300 firms) defined in terms of homogenous products provides strong evidence that prospect theory can explain the tradeoff between two of the most researched parameters in evaluating organizations, namely, risk and return.
Introduction
Risk and return are probably the two single parameters most researched by the various and related disciplines of economics, finance, and management. Although each one of them has looked at these two parameters from different aspects and for different purposes, they have provided a wide understanding of these two factors in the contest of the theory of the firm. The purpose of this study is to look closely at the relationship between these two important parameters in order to understand firm's competitive behavior, using the recent development in behavioral decision theory, namely, prospect theory [Kahneman and Tversky (1979) ]. Although March (1988) has criticized the discipline of management for its later adaptation in considering risk elements for evaluating organization performance and decision making processes, recent studies [e.g., Bettis (1981) , Rumelt (1974) , Singh (1986) , Jemison (1987) and Baird and Thomas (1986) ] have paid considerable attention to risk aspects in evaluating the performance of firms. In general, these studies have concluded that the characteristics of the firms environment, strategy, and implementation processes have significant and important influence on the firm's risk level and its associated rate of return. Bowman (1980) has looked closely at 85 U.S. industries and explored the *This research was supported by a grant from the School of Business Administration, The University of Michigan.
0167-2681/90/$03.50 0 199GElsevier Science Publishers B.V. (North-Holland) relationship between firm risk and return. Surprisingly, Bowman found that for most industries that he studied, a negative relationship between risk and return existed. Bowman's study was the first study that observed and reported this anomaly at the organization level and he named it the 'paradox' since it runs counter to the well believed positive relationship expected by economists.
Bowman has attributed his findings to two major factors. First, good managers can simultaneously increase returns and reduce risk (which causes the negative risk-return relationship). Decisions such as choosing the right environment, the right strategy and the right implementation procedures are the mechanism for creating this paradox. Indeed, studies by Bowman (1982) , Bettis (1981) , Bettis and Mahjan (1985) Singh (1986) , Cool and Dierk (1988) and Jemison (1987) have tested and confirmed that different organizational mechanisms can cause the negative risk-return association.
Second, managers are not risk averters as was mainly assumed by economists but, in fact, they are risk seekers.
Based on Bowman's second explanation, namely, managers' attitudes toward risk, Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1988) have used the recently developed behavioral decision theory, namely, 'prospect theory' [Kahneman and Tversky (1979) ] to explain the risk-return association.
In a simplified manner, prospect theory argues that individuals use target or reference points in evaluating risky choices. Further, individuals are not uniformly risk averse but adopt a mixture of risk-seeking when their outcomes are below the target level and risk-averting when their outcomes are above the target level. Indeed, this behavior was confirmed by many studies where individuals and managers were the subjects [e.g., Kahneman and Tversky (1979) , Crum et al. (1980 ) Fishburn and Kochenberger (1979 ), Laughhunn et al. (1980 ), Payne et al. (1980 , 1981 and Puto (1987) ]. In contrast, Fiegenbaum and Thomas's study was the first in which the prospect theory was tested in the context of organizational behavior. They have reported, in most of the 60 industries studied during the 196&1979 time period, negative association between risk and return for firms below their target, and positive association for firms above their target.
It should be noted that the management discipline departs in two major ways from the economics and the financial economics disciplines when dealing with risk. First, the attitude toward risk has been reported on theoretical and empirical grounds as an explanation for the risk-return relationship.
More specifically, the mixture of risk averse/risk-taker behavior is well accepted in the management discipline in contrast to most economics and financial economics studies that have assumed risk averse behavior. Second, management researchers have looked closely for the mechanism by which good managers can control their risk and return levels. Factors such as environment strategy and implementation were shown to control the riskreturn levels.
In this study further examination of the risk-return association under prospect theory explanation will be taken. A detailed analysis examining the tradeoff between risk and return for the two different domains, namely, below and above industry target, will be executed and compared. A new data base is established containing 85 industries, to test empirically our hypotheses. Diversification contaminations are excluded from this data base which overcomes some of the problems that might arise in Bowman (1980) and Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1986, 1988) studies. In general, the empirical findings provide further support for the argument that prospect theory framework can explain the risk-return association.
Theoretical background and hypotheses
Most of the earliest literature dealing with risk selection behavior developed around the expected utility model and it is summarized by Schoemaker (1982) . The term 'utility' was originally named to describe the overall pain and benefit derived from a particular choice. This theory was an extension of the classical utility theory used by economists to describe the rational decision-maker. A key assumption of the utility models is that decision-makers are risk averse. That assumption and the model have been a basic premise of much research in business, finance, economics and management science.
In terms of utility theory, the assumption implies that a decision-maker has a utility function that is uniformly concave or that individuals depart from risk averse behavior only under unusual circumstances.
Indeed, based on this model and assumption, the studies of Conrad and Plotkin (1968), Fisher and Hall (1969) , Cootner and Holland (1970), Neuman et al. (1979) have reported a positive relationship between organization risk and return levels. However, many researchers [e.g., Friedman and Savage (1948 ), Grayson (1959 ), Markowitz (1952 and Swalm (1966) ] have questioned the assumption of global risk aversion on both theoretical and empirical grounds.
The recent advances in behavioral decision theory were integrated into the prospect theory [Kahneman and Tversky (1979) ] framework. The theory has emphasized the role of reference, or target, in the analysis of risky choices. It is called prospect theory because a decision-maker first reduces each alternative in a decision problem to a series of prospects, and then evaluates each prospect according to a value function which was hypothesized to be 'S' shaped, or centered on the reference point.
The reference point is a critical element in this theory since the theory predicts that most individuals exhibit a mixture of risk-seeking and riskaverting behavior when the outcome is either below or above the reference point respectively.
An example from Kahneman and Tversky (1979) will illustrate this point.
One group of subjects was told that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative courses were offered to combat the disease. According to the first alternative, Option I would definitely save 200 lives while Option II offered a l/3 probability that 600 people would be saved and a 2/3 probability that no one would be saved. Only 28% chose Option II while the majority, 72x, chose Option I. The other alternative which was offered to the second group was told a similar scenario except the options were stated differently. Option I would definitely cause 400 people to die. Option II offered a l/3 probability that nobody would die and a 2/3 probability that 600 people would die. The majority of the people (78%) in this group chose Option II.
The two examples are equivalent; yet they were framed differently as lives saved with the first group and lives lost with the second group. The fact that the majority of the people preferred the prospect of the certainty of saving 200 lives rather than a risky prospect of equal expected value but with higher risk indicates that the decision-makers of this judgment were risk averse. In contrast, that the certain death of 400 people was less acceptable than the l/3 chance that 600 will die indicate that the decision-maker behaved as a risk-taker.
This kind of behavior was reported with different examples. However, space limitation precludes a thorough presentation of prospect theory. The interested reader is directed to the original papers summarized in Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1981, 1986 ). Four major hypotheses are made in prospect theory regarding the shape of the value function.
First, the importance of a reference point for choice decision. Second, individuals are risk averse when outcomes are associated with gains. Third, individuals are risk-seekers when outcomes are associated with losses. And, fourth, the function that describes the risk-taking behavior for below target return is steeper than the risk-averting function that describes the above target performers.
Indeed, empirical support for this theory has been found in individual decision-makers and it is reported in Fishburn (1977) Fishburn and Kochenberger (1979 ), Laughhunn et al. (1980 ) and Puto (1987 .
In contrast to previous studies that looked at prospect theory from the individual's decision making perspectives, Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1988) have looked at the theory at the organizational level and explored the relationships between organization risk and return levels. Using a correlation test, Fiegenbaum and Thomas found that in most industries negative and positive risk-return correlation exist for firms below and above their reference point respectively. Results were confirmed when the same test was performed for different time periods between 196s-1979.
This study builds upon the Fiegenbaum and Thomas approach which uses prospect theory to explain the risk-return association. However, this study is different from their study in two important manners. First, it attempts to estimate the tradeoff between risk and return rather than confirming that it obeys the risk averse and risk-seeking behavior. Second, a new data set is established in which a finer classification of industries is defined. In Fiegenbaum and Thomas the industries were defined in the broad terms of SIC (Standard Industrial classification) 2 digits. This contains diversitied firms which are assigned to one major industry although they are participating in different industries. This procedure may bias results in terms of the way that the reference point or target level is calculated and perceived by the firms. In this study, the data base is conceptually similar to the PIMS and FTC data bases which focus on business level competition.
Given the above description, the formal hypotheses can be stated as:
A negative association between risk and return exists for organizations facing below their target return.
Hypothesis

2:
A positive association between risk and return exists for organizations facing above their target return.
Hypothesis
3:
The relationship between risk and return is steeper for organizations facing below their industry target returns than their counterpart (above target).
Methodology
Data and sample
The COMPUSTAT BUSINESS SEGMENT tape is used to develop a research data base of firms and industries. This tape contains firms' segment data as reported by publicly traded firms in their 10-K and annual report. According to Financial Accounting Standard No. 14 [FASB (1976) ] each firm has to provide supplementary information about its business segment, which is detiend as any group of related businesses that comprises at least 10 percent of consolidated revenues, profits or assets. This procedure indicates the various firms' activity in terms of markets represented by SIC 4 digits. After firm activities are broken down into industry segments, we pooled firm segments that had reported activity in the same industry.
In this way we created an industry data base which includes information only about the industry. Diversification 'contamination' was removed from this data set. Two rules of thumb were made in order to determine our sample. First, only firm segments that have at least five years of data (compustat business segment contains information for only the 1977-1984 time period) were used in our sample. The reason for this is to be consistent with previous studies [e.g., Bowman (1980) , Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1988) ] as well as to minimize the bias of the measures. Second, only industries that had twenty or more companies reporting were kept in our sample in order to retain sufficient degrees of freedom for our estimation tests. Following these two criteria the sample includes 85 industries, with an average of about 40 firms in an industry.
Measures
Two measures have been operationalized: Namely, firm rate of return and risk levels. For the return measure we have used the average segment's return on asset (ROA) for the time period explored (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) . As a risk measure we have used the variance of segment return on asset for the same time period. This approach is similar to many studies including Bowman (1980 ), Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1986 , 1988 Thomas (1988) considered the median industry return as a proxy for a given firm's target level and it will also be used in this study.
Modeling and statistical tests
Since the purpose of this study is to explore the characteristics of prospect theory in the context of firm behavior, a mathematical model is built in order to describe the relationship between firm and return. The model to be tested for the three hypotheses can be written as:
where j stands for industry (j= 1, 2, . . .85), i stands for firm segment (i= 1, 2, m), aj is the constant term for industry j, bj is the coefficient which measures the tradeoff between risk and return for industry j.
This model is run separately for each of the 85 industries, as well as for the two domains, namely, above and below the industry target level. In this way the different relationship between risk and return for these two domains can be estimated and evaluated. According to the first two hypotheses, the bj sign should be negative for firms below their target (Hl) and positive for firms above their target (H2). To test the third hypothesis, namely, that the negative relationship is stronger than the positive one, we will compare the values of bj's for these different regimes.
Results
Appendix
1 presents the detailed results for the estimation characteristics of model 1, while table 1 summarizes the main results for our three hypotheses.
The left side of table 1 describes the results for the below target firms. It can be seen that for most industries the below target risk-return association (measured as b) was negative. More specifically, 73 coefficients were negative while only 12 were positive. In addition, 59 out of the 73 negative coefficients were negative and significant (at P 50.10) while only 2 out of the 12 positive coefftcients were positive and significant.
These results clearly support our first hypothesis which prospect theory will predict.
The right-hand side of table 1 describes the results for the above target returns. It can be seen that in 70 industries positive risk-return association was found while only 15 industries indicate a negative association. A closer look shows that out of the 70 industries, 47 indicated positive and significant relationships while only one industry shows a negative and significant relationship.
Again, clear support for prospect theory prediction for above target returns described in H2.
In order to test the third hypothesis the his distribution of the above and below target returns is investigated.
The median value is reported in table 1. It can be seen that the median value for the below target is -14.50 while for the above target is 5.13. (The t test indicates that the two slopes are significantly different at Ps 0.001.) This ratio of almost 3 to 1 clearly supports prospect theory characteristic which argues for a steeper association for risk-return relationships for below target performers.
Discussion and future directions
This study provides further evidence for a 'partial' risk-return paradox as was first observed and reported by Bowman (1980) . However, the findings of this study can eliminate the paradox term since it is consistent with current development in the literature of decision science and psychology. More specifically, the relationships between organizational risk and return levels were examined under the viewpoint of prospect theory [Kahneman and Tversky (1979) ] and the empirical findings have confirmed the validity of the theory to explain the explored phenomenon.
The first hypothesis confirmed the risk-seeking behavior of firms located below their target returns. This is indicated by the negative coefficient of the b coefficient of model 1 which estimates the tradeoff between risk and return.
The median risk-return coefficient for the 85 industries was -14.50. The second hypothesis has confirmed the risk averse behavior of firms located above their return target. The median risk-return tradeoff for the 85 industries was approximately 5. The third hypothesis has confirmed another prediction of prospect theory which argues that the tradeoff between risk and return for the loss domain should be much steeper than for the gain domain. Indeed, the empirical findings have found that the ratio of the slopes for the median value of the industries was approximately 3:l (below average over above average).
While previous studies have looked at some aspects of prospect theory to explain risk-return relationships at the organizational level, this is the first comprehensive study that looks at more detailed characteristics of the theory for a large sample. In addition, while Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1988) have confirmed a U-shape relationship between risk and return, they didn't estimate the size of the tradeoff for the below and above target domains, and their sample contains industries at the SIC 2 digits which contain information about firms not competing directly. It should be noted that Fishburn and Kochenberger (1977) have estimated the ratio of the tradeoff for utility functions for individuals of below and above targets. They found that the majority of below target functions were risk seeking and the majority of above target functions were risk averse and the below target utility was generally steeper than above target utility with a median below to above slope ratio of about 4.8. It is very interesting to find that this aspect of the theory which is captured in hypothesis 3 has found the same ratio to be 3:l which is very close to Fishburn and Kochenberger findings. The sample chosen for this study has several advantages. First, it has a large data base which covers 85 industries representing different sectors of the economy. Second, the industry is defined in terms of firms or division of firms that produce similar products. In contrast to previous large data base study [e.g., Bowman (1980 ), Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1986 , 1988 ] diversification 'contaminations' were eliminated from the data base. The findings of this study are summarized graphically in fig. 1 Aaker and Jacobson (1987), and Woo (1987) have looked at business level strategy and have estimated the impact of industry and organizational elements on the risk-return tradeoff. Second, future studies can explore different risk measures. It should be noticed that in this study we have considered firms' total risk. However, the discipline of financial economics that has looked at the firms from an investor standpoint has considered systematic risk as the relevant measure. The argument we make is that different measures of risk describe different aspects of the firm behavior. We encourage further study on systematic risk in the context of prospect theory. It will be very interesting to see if an assumption of risk averse behavior holds for the entire regime of the CAPM model.
Third, an important area for applying the findings of this study is in the context of the well-known industrial organization economics paradigm, namely, structure-conduct-performance.
According to this paradigm [e.g., Scherer (1980)] firm performance is determined by the characteristics of the industry and the strategy of the firm. Although previous studies have mentioned that performance might influence firm strategy, none of the studies have linked it in a consistent way. According to prospect theory and the findings of this study, the performance of the firm will influence firm strategy in such a way that firms below their target will be risk-takers and those above their target will be risk averse.
In terms of the model (model 1) we would suggest the following. First, that the target level can be determined in different ways. For example, deviation from a trend or deviation from expectation can be considered. It is well known that firms report this information in their annual report and hence, they might consider it as a target level. Another approach can be attributed to the recent development in the strategic group literature [e.g., Hunt (1972 ), Schendel and Patton (1978 ) Porter (1980 , Cool and Schendel (1987), Harrigan (1985) and Fiegenbaum and Thomas (forthcoming)]. According to this literature, industrial firms can be clustered into strategic groups, namely, groups of firms that have similar strategies. In this case, we will hypothesize that the target level will be the level of the group since the strategic group members are the close competitors of the firms [Porter (1980) ]. A special issue of the Journal of Business (1986) organized by Robin M. Hogarth and Melvin W. Reder, devoted its focus toward the behavioral foundations of economic theory. Initially, these studies were conducted mainly by psychologists, but recently, also by an increasing number of economists.
Based on recent theoretical development and empirical findings in the psychology/decision science disciplines, evidence of documented violations of the rational behavior assumption of economists have been reported. However, economists were criticized that when faced with evidence opposed to their belief of rational choice they argued for the irrelevance of the empirical findings [Grether and Plott (1979) ]. In this regard, this study provides further evidence for a nontraditional belief made by economists. We hope that the findings of this study, as well as others, will provide further stimulus for future dialogue between the traditional/non-traditional approaches in economics and management reseach.
Conclusion
This study attempts to explore in a detailed manner the association between organizational risk and return levels, based on recent research in behavioral decision theory, namely, prospect theory [Kahneman and Tversky (1979) ]. We use a new data base called COMPUSTAT BUSINESS SEGMENT in which a sample of 85 industries (about 3,300 firms) is explored. The empirical findings provide further support for prospect theory to explain the risk-return association as was reported by Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1988) . First, the importance of a target level in evaluating risky choices was found in most industries. Second, for industrial firms performing below their target level, the association between risk and return was negative, indicating that organizations are risk seekers. Third, for the complementary group, namely, firms who perform above their target, positive association between risk and return was found, indicating that organizations are risk averters.
Fourth, the below target risk-return association was generally steeper than above target, with a median below to above slope ratio of 3 to 1. Thereafter, the implications of these findings of the studying of competitive strategy are then discussed. 
